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GENDER-SELECTIVE SERVICE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF 
WOMEN AND THE DRAFT  
Elizabeth Farrington* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 1, 2016, President Obama became the first President 
since Jimmy Carter1 (and the second sitting President ever) to publicly sup-
port requiring women to register for the draft: “As old barriers for military 
service are being removed, the administration supports—as a logical next 
step—women registering for the Selective Service.”2 Of course, that support 
was largely symbolic; at the time his administration announced its support, 
President Obama had fifty days left in office, and the 2016 Senate provision3 
requiring women to register for selective service had already died in the 
House.4 
To be sure, the debate feels merely symbolic altogether. The United 
States has not drafted a man into service since 1972, and the military has 
been entirely voluntary since the Vietnam War.5 Comprising only those en-
listed by their own volition, the U.S. Military remains the strongest in the 
world.6 Even so, the U.S. Government has, at least for the time being, decid-
ed to keep selective service in its back pocket, should a situation arise. 
But the debate itself is important to anchor the discussion surrounding 
the role of women in the U.S. Armed Services, particularly following the 
2016 election. While Secretary of Defense Panetta officially lifted the ban 
 
      * Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable Helene White, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit. J.D. 2016, University of Illinois College of Law; M.A. 2013, Old Dominion Univer-
sity; B.S. 2007, U.S. Naval Academy. This Essay was shaped, in large part, through my time 
on active duty from 2007–2013. But the views expressed herein are mine alone and in no way 
purport to represent the views of the U.S. Navy. 
 1. Transcript: Selective Service Revitalization Statement on the Registration of Ameri-
cans for the Draft (Feb. 8, 1980), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=
32906. 
 2. Gregory Korte & Tom Vanden Brook, White House: Obama Supports Registering 
Women for Military Draft, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2016, 5:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/politics/2016/12/01/obama-supports-registering-women-military-draft/90449708/ 
 3. See infra note 9. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. Mark Thompson, America’s Last Draftee: “I’m a Relic,” TIME, (Feb. 7, 2009), htt
p://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1877943,00.html. 
 6. CREDIT SUISSE, The End of Globalization or a more Multipolar World?, 41 (Sep. 
2015), available at http://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/index.cfm?fileid=E
E7A6A5D-D9D5-6204-E9E6BB426B47D054. 
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on women in combat in 2013,7 the GOP’s 2016 official platform sought “to 
exempt women from ‘direct ground combat units and infantry battalions.’”8 
Republicans in Congress kept step with the spirit of that policy. The Senate 
passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which included a 
provision for an all-gender draft, but the provision was removed by the time 
the bill made it to the floor of the Republican-controlled House.9 The ques-
tion of registering women for the draft would be left to the next Congress to 
ignore or decide, one under Republican control that may plan to reinstate the 
ban on women in combat roles.10 These two issues—women in combat roles 
and women registering for the draft—are separate, but intrinsically linked. If 
women remain eligible for combat positions, which they are as of the date of 
this publication, Congress may be hard-pressed to find justification for ex-
cluding women from draft registration.11 This essay argues that requiring 
women to register for the draft is not only the logical next step towards gen-
der parity in the military; it is also absolutely required to remain faithful to 
the Supreme Court’s gender discrimination precedent. 
At many crucial points in our nation’s history, “in fundamental issues 
of social fairness, the military has led the country in doing what is right.”12 
But not so with the role of women in the military. Exploring the progress of 
women in uniform alongside that of their civilian counterparts, this essay 
notes that the strides women in the military made—while incredible, and 
rightfully lauded—were met with greater resistance. As the Supreme Court 
was recognizing the need for increased scrutiny in gender discrimination 
cases, women in uniform were being denied access to most rates and billets 
in their respective service.13 Just as women finally seemed to be making 
headway in gaining leadership positions, the United States sought to in-
 
 7. Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, Pentagon Is Set to Lift Combat Ban for 
Women, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/us/pentagon-says-
it-is-lifting-ban-on-women-in-combat.html. 
 8. Jeff Daniels, Trump Could Nix Obama’s Women in Combat Military Policy, CNBC 
(Nov. 14, 2016, 5:08 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/14/trump-could-nix-obamas-wo
men-in-combat-military-policy.html. 
 9. Compare S.2943, 114th Cong. § 591 (2016) (“National Defense Authorization Act”) 
(Sec. 591(b)(1): “The duty to register imposed on male citizens and persons residing in the 
United States by subsection (a) shall apply to female citizens of the United States and female 
persons residing in the United States who attain the age of 18 years on or after January 1, 
2018.”), with H.R. 4909,114th Cong. (2016) (enacted) (“National Defense Authorization 
Act”) (provision removed). See Richard Sisk, Congress May Not Require Women to Register 
for the Draft, MILITARY.COM (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/11/0
8/congress-require-women-register-draft.html. 
 10. Sisk, supra note 9. 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. Lt. Gen. Julius Becton, Jr., USA(ret.), Presentation: The Military and Public Behav-
ior (Dec. 1997), http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/ptbecton.html. 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
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crease the size of the military and prepare for any number of real world sce-
narios that could escalate to World War III,14 but the executive and legisla-
tive branches disagreed on the best way to do so. President Carter reinstated 
the draft with a provision to include women, but Congress elected to author-
ize the funds required to register only men.15 
The decision to keep women from registering for the draft was imme-
diately challenged and quickly made its way to the United States Supreme 
Court. In Rostker v. Goldberg,16 the Court upheld the provision, showing 
unwavering deference to Congressional findings despite the established in-
termediate scrutiny standard.17 In the years that followed, women in the 
military had to overcome that stigma. With a little help from the Virginia 
Military Institute, decades of slow, silent soldiering on culminated in 2013 
when Defense Secretary Carter ended the combat exclusionary rule for 
women and opened all military roles to women who qualify.18 The Supreme 
Court may hear challenges in the coming terms regarding gender neutral 
draft registration, with the architect of intermediate scrutiny now on the oth-
er side of the bench. 
II. THE DIVERGING LIVES OF WOMEN IN AND OUT OF UNIFORM 
The 1960’s and 70’s—the “second-wave” of feminism—saw the wom-
en’s movement, that had previously focused on suffrage and property rights, 
broaden to include sexuality, workplace equality, and reproductive rights.19 
Legal victories helped solidify the foundation for the movement, particularly 
the Equal Pay Act,20 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,21 Title IX,22 
and Griswold v. Connecticut, which struck down the state’s ban on contra-
ception under the now widely applied right to privacy found in the “penum-
bras” and “emanations” of other constitutional protections.23 
 
 14. See infra Parts II.B., II.C. 
 15. See infra Part II.C. 
 16. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
 17. Id. at 83. 
 18. See Sisk, supra note 9. 
 19. See generally Cynthia Harrison, Creating a National Feminist Agenda: Coalition 
Building in the 1970s, in Feminist Coalitions, in FEMINIST COALITIONS: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 19 (Stephanie Gilmore 
ed., 2008). 
 20. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2016)). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). 
 22. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (June 23, 1972) 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (1986)). 
 23. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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As the movement gained momentum on the civilian front, women 
seeking to broaden their roles in the military found legal support as well. 
President Johnson signed Public Law 90-130 in 1967, which opened ad-
vanced military ranks to women (including General and Admiral) and lifted 
the two percent ceiling on the number of women in the military.24 Then in 
1975, President Ford signed Public Law 94-106,25 authorizing women to be 
admitted into the service academies. 
Even so, the push for gender parity in the armed services was met with 
greater opposition from both military and civilian leadership. While endors-
ing the law that opened advanced military ranks to women, the House 
Armed Services Committee nevertheless stated: “There cannot be complete 
equality between men and women in the matter of military careers. The 
stern demands of combat, sea duty, and other types of assignments directly 
related to combat are not placed upon women in our society.”26 The Com-
mittee further noted that “[t]he Defense Department assured [them] that 
there would be no attempt to remove restrictions on the kind of military du-
ties women will be expected to perform.”
 27 General Hershey, former Direc-
tor of the Selective Service System, echoed: “There is no question but that 
women could do a lot of things in the military service. So could men in 
wheelchairs. But you couldn’t expect the services to want a whole company 
of people in wheelchairs.”28 
It’s easy to view the long, slow road to military gender parity in a vac-
uum; fifty years after the Department of Defense “assured the committee” 
that women would remain barred from the majority of billets, the DoD re-
scinded the combat exclusion and eliminated all gender-based barriers to 
service.29 In three generations, women went from total exclusion to formal 
parity. But women out of uniform faced an uphill battle as well and saw 
faster, broader progress. While many of the causes second-wave feminism 
fought for impacted women in uniform, there was no blueprint available for 
challenging gender discrimination in the military before the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) invested in women’s rights and placed Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg at the helm. 
 
 24. Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (1967). 
 25. Act of Oct. 7, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-106, 89 Stat. 531 (1975). 
 26. Report of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, in 
VICTORIA SHERROW, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 24 (2007). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L. J. 1533, 1533 n.5 
(1973) (quoting Coye, The Restricted Unrestricted Line Officer: The Status of the Navy’s 
Woman Line Officer, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. (1972). 
 29. See Bumiller and Shanker, supra note 7. 
2017] MILITARY LAW 283 
A. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Intermediate Scrutiny 
While many second-wave feminist scholars view Betty Friedan or Glo-
ria Steinem as the “mother of the movement,”30 Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s ef-
fort as Director of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project deserves praise in 
its own right. Before Ginsburg argued for a higher standard of review for 
statutes that distinguish between citizens on the basis of gender, the U.S. 
Supreme Court had never found a gender classification unconstitutional.31 
“Ginsburg recognized the need for a well-developed, long-range strategy to 
chip away at precedent, to establish new principles incrementally, and to 
pave the way for changing the law on gender discrimination.”32 
Prior to Ginsburg’s time with the ACLU, the Supreme Court applied 
two standards of review to analyze an Equal Protection challenge to a stat-
ute: “rational basis,” with maximum deference, or a “more stringent” test 
that would later be known as “strict scrutiny.”33 The more stringent test de-
rived from Justice Harlan Stone’s majority opinion in United States v. Caro-
lene Prods. Co.34 Nearly hidden in what would otherwise remain an “utterly 
unremarkable” decision,35 Justice Stone noted that the deference afforded to 
economic regulations—the “rational basis” test—was “inadequate when 
dealing with fundamental rights, particularly in the case of ‘discrete and 
insular minorities.’”36 
Out of that footnote grew the “strict scrutiny” standard. In legislation 
that does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect class of “discrete 
and insular minorities,”37 courts will uphold the law so long as there is a 
rational basis for it.38 However, if the legislation implicates a fundamental 
right or a “suspect class” of persons,39 courts will strike down the law unless 
it is “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling government interest.”40 The 
strict scrutiny test has primarily been applied to statutes that distinguish be-
tween persons on account of their race,41 but has also been used to strike 
 
 30. See Harrison, supra note 19 at 23. 
 31. Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 
U. HAW. L. REV. 699, 715 (citations omitted). 
 32. Id. at 720. 
 33. Id. at 714. 
 34. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 35. See Elizabeth Farrington, Note, Federally Mandated Discrimination: The Irrecon-
cilability of Civil Rights and Export Control, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 251, 277–78. 
 36. Id. at 278 (quoting United States v. Carolene, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152. 
 39. Id. at n.4. 
 40. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 41. See id.; See also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
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down classifications based on religion,42 national origin,43 alienage (if the 
classification is found in a state statute),44 and fundamental rights.45 
For all the progress the movement made pressuring elected officials to 
pass gender parity legislation,46 the laws were not rigorously enforced.47 
Ginsburg thus “sought to challenge gender classification principles by edu-
cating the Court and the legal community of the changing roles of women. 
Ginsburg’s initial step was ‘to awaken the Supreme Court and begin to per-
suade the court to take seriously the argument that sex-based classifications 
[were] inherently suspect.’”48 The problem with applying the strict scrutiny 
standard to laws that distinguish on the basis of gender is, first and foremost, 
that women make up half of the population.49 While scholars may disagree 
on what “discrete and insular minorities” means, most agree that women, as 
a class, are not one.50 Even so, Ginsburg “skillfully crafted the pattern for 
structuring her argument: focus on the strict scrutiny standard; identify the 
government objective; challenge the assumption and/or overbroad generali-
zation about women; compare the status of ‘similarly situated’ males and 
females; and demonstrate the irrationality of the relationship between classi-
fication and government interest.”51 
 
 42. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 43. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
 44. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 45. This term is usually understood to represent the rights explicitly or implicitly guar-
anteed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible and Tract  Soc’y  of  N.Y.  v.  Village  
of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (striking down an ordinance requiring registration before 
religious solicitors go door to door as violating the First Amendment). Of note, the First 
Amendment has varying degrees of scrutiny depending on the type of speech that is involved; 
for example, commercial speech receives intermediate scrutiny. See Cent. Hudson v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). But as a general rule, courts will apply strict scrutiny to 
laws that impact an individual’s ability to exercise the “fundamental rights” – including but 
limited to voting, reproductive freedom, and interstate travel. See Ellington et al., supra note 
30, at 716 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)); Harper 
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 630 (1969) overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 46. See supra, notes 18–22. 
 47. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 720. 
 48. Id. at 720–721 (citing Deborah L. Markowitz, Ruth Ginsburg: Women’s Rights 
Advocate-Supreme Court Justice, 20 VT. B.J. & L. DIG., Oct. 1994, at 9); Jennifer S. Thomas, 
Ruth Ginsburg: Carving a Career Path Through Male-Dominated Legal World, 51 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. REP. 29, July 17, 1993, at 1876. 
 49. Age and Sex Composition: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 2011), https://www.ce
nsus.gov/prod/cen2010/ briefs/c2010br-03.pdf. 
 50. See Natalie Wexler, Sex Discrimination: The Search for a Standard, SUP. CT. HIST. 
SOC., http://supremecourthistory.org/lc_womens_rights.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2017) 
(“But women do not fit neatly into the Carolene Products mold of “discrete and insular mi-
norities”: they are not discrete or insular, nor are they a minority.”). 
 51. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 722. 
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In 1971, Ginsburg challenged an Idaho statute that created a preference 
for men as administrators of estates.52 Because the “law assumed that men 
had more business experience and were better qualified as administrators,”53 
she argued that “the civil status of women was no longer subject to general 
legal disabilities and sex, as an unalterable trait, should be considered a sus-
pect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.”54 Comparing sex 
discrimination to segregation, Ginsburg focused her argument on the stereo-
types of women often cited to justify discriminatory laws.55 The Supreme 
Court was adequately persuaded, but not in the way Ginsburg hoped: it 
struck down the law because it lacked a rational basis.56 The Court did not 
adopt strict scrutiny to analyze laws distinguishing on the basis of gender.57 
Ginsburg had another chance to convince the Court that heightened 
scrutiny was required in gender discriminatory statutes just eighteen months 
later. In Frontiero v. Richardson,58 Ginsburg challenged statutes providing 
dependency benefits to all wives of servicemen, but not to all husbands of 
servicewomen. Brilliantly, by challenging gender classifications that formal-
ly favored women, Ginsburg was able to highlight how longstanding stereo-
types lack rational basis and detrimentally impact both men and women.59 
The Court overturned the statute, but a plurality of only four Justices, led by 
Brennan, voted to adopt strict scrutiny. The other members of the eight-
Justice majority followed Reed to strike down the statute under rational ba-
sis.60 
Without a majority to support the application of strict scrutiny, Gins-
burg began advocating for a middle ground—an intermediate standard of 
review. Focusing on Social Security cases, where widowers received fewer 
benefits than widows, and jury duty cases, where service was mandatory for 
men and voluntary for women, Ginsburg found “mixed results.”61 In one 
such social security case, a young woman died in childbirth and her widow-
 
 52. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 53. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 723. 
 54. Gender and Legal History Paper Summary, GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY, https://w
ww.law.georgetown.edu/library/collections/gender-legal-history/glh-summary.cfm?glhID=62
9544B9-D3C4-BA2A-1D1AB3EA82759959 (last visited May 26, 2017). 
 55. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 722–23. 
 56. Reed, 404 U.S. at 77. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
 59. Ginsburg also argued that this actually hurt women by relegating them to a depend-
ent place in a man’s world. See Ellington et. al, supra note 31, at 729. But formally, this 
statute placed a higher burden on men than women, and was thus viewed as more favorable 
to female military spouses. 
 60. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 730 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678). 
 61. Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman’s Work to Change the 
Law, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 335, 345–46 (1992). 
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er became unemployed due to difficulty seeking childcare for his infant 
son.62 The father obtained social security benefits, but the other available 
“mother’s insurance benefits” were authorized for women only.63 The Court 
unanimously struck down the statute, finding that the challenged classifica-
tion was indistinguishable from the statute in Frontiero64 and that “all par-
ties were victims of invidious sex-discrimination.”65 Again, however, the 
Court declined to formally adopt heightened scrutiny. 
Less than one year later, that changed. The Supreme Court heard Craig 
v. Boren, which challenged an Oklahoma law that allowed women to buy 
certain beer after turning eighteen whereas men were not allowed to do so 
until they turned twenty-one.66 The ACLU did not represent the plaintiffs, 
but Ginsburg wrote an amicus brief arguing that sex classifications should 
be subject to heightened, though not necessarily strict, scrutiny and writing 
that “sex classification could not be justified on any basis.”67 The Court 
agreed. The majority found the law violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because it was not shown to be “substantially related to [the] achievement of 
the statutory objective.”68 That has now become the “intermediate scrutiny” 
standard—a law that distinguishes between individuals on the basis of sex 
must be “substantially related” to an “important government objective.”69 
Due in large part to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, just five years after the Su-
preme Court first struck down a statute that classified individuals on the 
basis of sex, the intermediate scrutiny standard became precedent. 
B. Wearing the Stripes, Earning the Salute 
On one hand, comparing the legal and societal progress of women in 
and out of uniform during the 1970’s should be straightforward—like com-
paring apples to apples that sometimes wear an orange peel. As just one 
example, Frontiero challenged statutes providing dependency benefits to all 
wives of servicemen, but not to all husbands of servicewomen.70 Invalidat-
ing that statute impacted many women, but it specifically impacted women 
 
 62. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 (1975). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 653. 
 65. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 733. Ginsburg wrote that the majority of Justices 
“thought it was discrimination against the woman as wage earner . . . . A few thought it was 
discrimination against the man, because he didn’t have the same opportunity to give personal 
care to the baby . . . . And one, [Chief Justice Rehnquist], thought it was discrimination 
against the baby.” 
 66. 429 U.S. 190, 191–192 (1976). 
 67. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 735 (citation omitted). 
 68. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204. 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 70. 411 U.S. 677, 690–691 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
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in uniform who are married to a non-military spouse. But the hierarchy in 
place within the U.S. Armed Forces provides a legal and administrative sys-
tem all its own. As a result, many of the women seeking to challenge dis-
criminatory practices or policies in the military had to do so through admin-
istrative channels, often without the benefit of counsel and without the op-
portunity to find public support.71 Even so, the comparison is useful in set-
ting the stage for legislative and judicial response to the question of women 
and the draft. 
Although President Johnson lifted the two percent ceiling on the num-
ber of women in the military in 1967,72 each respective branch of the mili-
tary could “prescribe the authorized strength of female enlisted and officer 
personnel.”73 This stymied any effect lifting the ban might have had. In 
1973, the Secretaries of each branch chose to limit the number of female 
service members to less than two percent of the total service personnel.74 By 
choosing to employ so few females compared to their male counterparts, the 
military was able to place more stringent demands on female applicants. 
Specifically, men could enlist at age seventeen, whereas women had to be 
older than eighteen.75 Women with dependent children had to obtain a waiv-
er to enlist, which was not required of male enlistees.76 Women also needed 
to achieve higher scores on mental aptitude tests and had to possess higher 
educational certifications than their male counterparts.77 Although barred 
from service specialties that require “heavy” labor, let alone combat, the 
minimum physical standard was more stringently applied to women than 
men as well.78 
What is striking about those standards, of course, is that the United 
States was actively drafting young men into military service at that time.79 
The U.S. Military thought it was better served by drafting men into service 
than accepting more women who were volunteering to join. There is no data 
available on which to argue the United States could have avoided a draft had 
 
 71. See generally JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
(1992). 
 72. Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (1967). 
 73. The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, supra note 28, at 1539 (citing 10 
U.S.C. §§ 3209, 3215, 8208, 8215 (1970)). 
 74. See Id. (citing Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on the Utilization of Manpow-
er in the Military of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 12439 
(1972)). 
 75. Id. at 1539 n.41 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 505 (1970)). 
 76. Id. at 1540 & n. 46 (citation omitted). 
 77. Id. at 1540 & n.42 (citation omitted). 
 78. Id. at 1540 n.44–45 (citations omitted). 
 79. The Vietnam Lotteries, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, https://www.sss.gov/About/Hist
ory-And-Records/lotter1 (last visited February 9, 2017). 
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they allowed more women to enlist, but eighty-five percent of military bil-
lets were noncombatant, even at the height of the Vietnam war.80 
Whether it was the result of the decision to end the draft and shift to an 
all-volunteer military force (AVF), the influence of the larger women’s 
movement, or some combination of the two, women made tangible progress 
throughout the latter half of the 1970’s towards military gender parity.81 
Without the draft, the Department of Defense increased recruiting goals for 
women; by 1976, one in every thirteen recruits was female (compared to one 
in thirty just four years prior).82 
One of the most institutionalized barriers women faced was the oppor-
tunity to serve as an officer in the military. Female candidates for Army 
Officer Candidate School (OCS) needed two years of college and a mental 
aptitude score of 115; male candidates needed only a high school diploma or 
equivalent and an aptitude score of 110.83 Direct appointments to a number 
of officer positions in the Navy and Marine Corps were statutorily limited to 
males84 and the military’s ROTC program only opened to women in 1970, 
and even then, was “available only on a limited, experimental basis.”85 
For that reason, Public Law 94-106, which mandated female admission 
to the three major service academies (Army at West Point, Navy at Annapo-
lis, and Air Force at Colorado Springs), was a monumental victory for 
women in the military.86 The first women entered the service academies in 
 
 80. The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, supra note 28, at 1541 (citing 118 
CONG. REC. S4390 (daily ed. March 21, 1972)). 
 81. See 1970’s: The Decade, THE WOMEN’S MEMORIAL, http://www.womensmemorial.
org/history/detail/?s=1970sthe-decade (last visited February 4, 2017). 
 82. Id. 
 83. The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, supra note 28, at 1542 & n.53 (cita-
tions omitted). 
 84. Id. at 1542 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 5575, 5576, 5577, 5587 (1970)). 
 85. Id. at 1542 & nn.57–58 (citations omitted). 
 86. See Act of Oct. 7, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-106, 89 Stat. 531 (1975). The law provided: 
Sec. 803. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the administration of 
chapter 403 of title 10, United States Code . . . (relating to the United States Mili-
tary Academy), chapter 603 of such title (relating to the United States Naval 
Academy), and chapter 903 of such title (relating to the United States Air Force 
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1976 and, unsurprisingly, were swiftly met with strong opposition.87 But 
crucially, despite opposition both on and off campus, women were admitted 
to service academies and would be eligible to receive a commission through 
the academy starting in 1980.88 
With the service academies set to produce more female officers, the 
military found itself considering the billets these women would be eligible 
to fill. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) had passed and was pending 
ratification.89 No one knew whether the ERA would be ratified or what ef-
fect it might have on the role of women in the military. It was never rati-
fied,90 but some of the steps taken by the military indicate that leadership 
expected some formal mandate regarding the billets women could fill and 
opted to proactively “open-up” a number of roles to women.91 
Weapons training became mandatory for women92 and both the Army 
and Navy allowed women to enter pilot training.93 For the first time, a wom-
an was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General.94 The U.S. Coast Guard 
reviewed the need for permanent female officers and found that, while there 
was “[n]o need for regular women officers . . . Nevertheless, considering all 
factors, it is in the overall best interest of the Coast Guard to begin a con-
trolled women officer program with provisions for integration into the regu-
lar Coast Guard included.”95 The report concluded: “Planning and execution 
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of a women officer program in the Coast Guard is overdue.”96 Each branch 
welcomed female officers and enlisted personnel into its respective intelli-
gence community,97 along with other restricted line specialties like the Judge 
Advocate General Corps (JAG).98 While women were not yet allowed on 
warships, female Sailors were assigned to service craft.99 The courts helped 
too; in 1976, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that the Marine 
Corps policy of involuntarily discharging pregnant Marines violated the Due 
Process Clause.100 
Although many rates and billets in each service remained closed to fe-
male service members, the tide had changed. Women were carving out a 
significant place for themselves in the military across all branches and 
ranks. In the context of the larger women’s movement, with the support of 
President Carter (a Naval Academy graduate),101 the barriers to gender parity 
in the military seemed to be falling. 
C. Rostker v. Goldberg: The Pendulum Stops 
As noted above, following the national fatigue brought on by the Vi-
etnam War, the United States discontinued the draft in 1975.102 But just five 
years later, President Carter felt the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed “a 
serious threat to a region that is vital to the long-term interests of the United 
States and our allies.”103 It represented: 
the first time since World War II that the Soviets have used their military 
force to invade an independent nation outside the sphere of the Warsaw 
Pact. This brutal act of aggression has called forth the condemnation of 





Thus, President Carter re-established the Military Selective Service 
System (MSSS) in the event that the United States needed to reinstate the 
draft itself: “Registration . . . will improve our capacity, if circumstances 
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require, to increase the size and strength of our Armed Forces—and that 
capacity will itself help to maintain peace and to prevent conflict in the re-
gion of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia.”105 
Crucially, President Carter recommended that the Act be amended so 
that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) extended to include women: 
My decision to register women is a recognition of the reality that both 
women and men are working members of our society. It confirms what is 
already obvious throughout our society—that women are now providing 
all types of skills in every profession. The military should be no excep-
tion. In fact, there are already 150,000 women serving in our Armed 
Forces today, in a variety of duties, up from 38,000 only 10 years ago. 
They are performing well, and they have improved the level of skills in 
every branch of the military service. 
 There is no distinction possible, on the basis of ability or perfor-
mance, that would allow me to exclude women from an obligation to 
register.
106 
President Carter’s recommendations to reinstate the MSSA and to in-
clude women in the registration were then sent to Congress, who would 
need to pass funding for MSSA registration. 
The issue was considered extensively in hearings, committee, and de-
bate. In fact, debate over Carter’s recommendations “dominated Congress 
for months, until Congress passed on June 25, 1980 . . . a statute funding 
registration for men only.”107 Nearly every analysis of the Rostker decision 
noted below nods to these extensive debates, largely due to the Court’s reli-
ance on such “careful consideration and debate.108 But as at least one scholar 
noted: 
In fact, the debate about Carter’s proposal was not a break with the past, 
and fit smoothly within over a decade of debate over women’s military 
roles. In 1980, powerful governmental and popular voices[—]whether 
for or against Carter’s proposal[—]remained determined to limit wom-
en’s military service in ways designed to maintain and enforce women’s 
place in the family and civilian employment.
109
 
Nevertheless, after such debate, Congress passed and President Carter 
signed into law Pub. L. 96-282.110 The exclusion of women was immediately 
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challenged through a previously stayed case. The U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed with the plaintiffs that the exclusion 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.111 Stayed by Justice Brennan (then 
Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit),112 the U.S. Supreme Court took the 
appeal immediately. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist reversed the district court’s 
decision.113 The Court noted the intermediate scrutiny standard, but didn’t 
appear to apply it with the same rigor it had been using: “The Court has 
struck down laws that discriminate on the basis of sex unless they are ‘sub-
stantially related to an important governmental interest.’ While Justice 
Rehnquist referred to that standard in his opinion, his overriding theme was 
that of judicial deference to the will of Congress.”114 That was not a contro-
versial legal analysis; the opinion explicitly noted that “[t]he case arises in 
the context of Congress’ authority over national defense and military affairs, 
and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater defer-
ence.”115 
To be sure, raising and supporting an army for the national defense116 is 
an important government interest; no one in the case argued otherwise. But 
with the increased breadth of roles women filled in the armed services by 
1981, the Court’s decision to give what seems like rational-basis level def-
erence to the findings of Congress suggests that issues involving women in 
the military have a different standard altogether.117 Moreover, the decision 
fails to scrutinize the relationship between that interest and classification 
involved. 
Justice Rehnquist seemed satisfied that, because women were barred 
from combat, registering only men was “substantially related” to the inter-
ests served in drafting service members. Yet, as noted above and outlined in 
the briefings for this case, less than fifteen percent of military roles were 
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combatant.118 When the district court heard the case it “did not agree that the 
justifications offered by the Government for an exclusively male draft regis-
tration were substantially related to the achievement of any important gov-
ernmental interests.”119 In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted the same issue: 
[A] gender-based classification cannot withstand constitutional challenge 
unless the classification is substantially related to the achievement of an 
important governmental objective. . . . Consequently, before we can sus-
tain the MSSA, the Government must demonstrate that the gender-based 
classification it employs bears ‘a close and substantial relationship to 
[the achievement of] important governmental objectives.’
120
 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and White, felt the gov-
ernment had not shown—as would be its burden under intermediate scruti-
ny—that drafting only men bore a close and substantial relationship to its 
objectives. To the contrary, Justice Marshall felt “there simply is no basis 
for concluding in this case that excluding women from registration is sub-
stantially related to the achievement of a concededly important governmen-
tal interest in maintaining an effective defense.”121 Marshall noted with in-
credulity the notion that Congress felt it needed to exclude women rather 
than amend the Act to authorize drafting different numbers of men and 
women or drafting into noncombatant roles (which it already did).122 He 
concluded that: 
neither the Senate Report itself nor the testimony presented at the con-
gressional hearings provides any support for the conclusion the Court 
seeks to attribute to the Report—that drafting a limited number of wom-
en, with the number and the timing of their induction and training deter-
mined by the military’s personnel requirements,
123
 
would burden military objectives in administration or training, as the 
Government challenged. 
So why didn’t the Court adhere to the intermediate scrutiny standard it 
established just a few years prior and continues to apply today? The opinion 
tends to signal that, when it comes to national defense, women are (poten-
tial) service members first and women second. That is, because deference to 
the legislature seems to be at its peak on matters of national security and 
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defense,124 the Court may not really apply traditional scrutiny standards. 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion seems to signal—at least for the Rostker majori-
ty—that was the case.125 
III. SOLDIERING ON: REVISITING ROSTKER AND THE ROAD FORWARD 
Some thirty-five years later, Rostker “continues to be significant.”126 
Opponents of military gender parity cite Rostker not only to “validate[] the 
combat exclusion, [but also to] extend[] the influence of the policy and the 
idea.”127 By excluding women from registration, Congress, and eventually 
the Supreme Court, seemed to state “that every man, regardless of any disa-
bility, must register, but that all women, regardless of competency, can-
not.”128 This reinforced “the myth that all men are more competent than all 
women.”129 
That sentiment remains, albeit far less prevalent.130 Societal reticence 
notwithstanding, the legal justifications cited in Rostker no longer hold wa-
ter. Although no challenges to the draft on the basis of gender discrimination 
have reached the Supreme Court since Rostker, all evidence seems to sug-
gest the current Supreme Court would reverse course. And the Court may 
have such an opportunity: two lawsuits have already started to make their 
way through the courts. In February 2016, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of 
the National Coalition for Men, who challenged the exclusion of women 
from the draft on the grounds that it is a violation of Equal Protection.131 The 
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case is currently being reconsidered by the district court. Additionally pend-
ing is Kyle v. Selective Service, a case brought by a 17-year-old girl suing 
for the right to legally register for the Selective Service.132 
A gender-neutral draft is the logical next step considering the evolving 
roles of women in the military. Notably: 
The first woman to command a U.S. Navy warship did so in 1990. In 
1991, women were cleared to fly fighter jets in combat; two years later, 
Congress authorized women to serve on combat ships at sea. 1998 
marked the first female fighter pilots to fly combat missions off of an 
aircraft carrier. The first women to command a U.S. Navy warship and 
U.S. Air Force fighter squadron were given their commands in 1998 and 
2004, respectively. By 2010, women were cleared to serve aboard sub-
marines. According to the Army, by September 2015 ‘437 women 
earned awards for valor to include two Silver Stars, three Distinguished 
Flying Crosses, 31 Air Medals, and 16 Bronze Stars.’ As Secretary 
Carter noted, between the 2013 memorandum and the 2015 policy 




Since the combat exclusion has been lifted, the argument that the Unit-
ed States only drafted men for combat positions lacks even a tangential rela-
tionship to the stated goals of selective service registration. That said, the 
GOP’s 2016 official platform sought “to exempt women from ‘direct ground 
combat units and infantry battalions.’”134 While this platform seems to be in 
contention with military leadership,135 and even in contention with some 
prominent Republicans,136 it is worth considering the fate of women and the 
draft in the event that the ban on women in combat is reinstated. 
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Should that occur, the result should still be the same: the justifications 
for excluding women from the draft no longer remain. “[W]omen serve—
and die—in combat, as the [] war in Iraq has amply demonstrated.”137 Even 
before the Obama Administration pushed to lift the combat ban, women 
were “barred from an unprecedentedly small and steadily decreasing number 
of military positions, and only by military regulation rather than statute. 
Public opinion surveys find markedly increased support for women’s mili-
tary service, including in combat.”138 
Immediately following Rostker, “several lawyers for feminist organiza-
tions that participated in the case said they thought the majority’s rationale 
signaled a retreat from the special ‘scrutiny’ that the Court has applied to 
sex discrimination issues in the last five years.”139 But in a symmetry not 
often found in the legal world, those lawyers would be proven decidedly 
wrong fifteen years later when the architect of intermediate scrutiny, now 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, wrote for the majority in United States v. Vir-
ginia.140 If Rostker represented the low water mark for intermediate scrutiny, 
United States v. Virginia seems to represent the inverse.141 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Ginsburg applied “skeptical scrutiny,”142 seemingly the 
version of intermediate scrutiny Justice Marshall envisioned in his Rostker 
dissent. 
At the time the case was heard, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) 
only admitted men.143 This state-run facility (thus left unchanged after the 
federal service academies integrated women) was gender segregated. The 
state wished to avoid an Equal Protection challenge by opening a separate 
facility for females, the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership 
(VWIL).144 The state produced evidence surrounding the “adversative meth-
od” employed at VMI, which it believed could only accommodate male stu-
dents.145 Justice Ginsburg’s decision demanded more justification and af-
forded less deference to VMI. Channeling years of litigation spent in pursuit 
of heightened scrutiny for gender discrimination, Ginsburg wrote: 
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’Inherent differences’ between men and women, we have come to appre-
ciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the mem-
bers of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s oppor-
tunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate women ‘for par-
ticular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,’ to ‘promot[e] equal 
employment opportunity,’ to advance full development of the talent and 
capacities of our Nation’s people. But such classifications may not be 
used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and 
economic inferiority of women.
146
 
Within that context, the Court found that “Virginia ha[d] shown no 
‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for excluding all women from the 
citizen-soldier training afforded by VMI.”147 
Twenty years later, the arguments for excluding women from selective 
service registration fail within the context of today’s female service mem-
bers and fail under this standard. “The transformation in women’s military 
status has undermined Rostker’s foundation, making restrictions on wom-
en’s military service that Rostker did not explain because they seemed so 
commonsensical now demand explanation and appear constitutionally vul-
nerable.”148 There is no longer a viable, let alone exceedingly persuasive, 
justification for this exclusion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Even in the current geopolitical climate, there is nothing to suggest the 
United States will draft any citizen into military service ever again. Yet 
Congress still debates (or taunts)149 the registration of women for selective 
service and males must register within thirty days of their eighteenth birth-
day. This classification is based on sex and, just as the statutes Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg challenged, seems to favor women: those women who want to 
serve still can but those that do not wish to do so do not risk being drafted. 
But if there ever was an exceedingly persuasive justification for the exclu-
sion, it flew out the window of a female-piloted F-14 decades ago. And 
what’s more, the exclusion does not favor women, particularly those within 
the service: by excluding women from registration, Congress reinforces the 
harmful stereotype “that every man, regardless of any disability, must regis-
ter, but that all women, regardless of competency, cannot.”
 150 This myth—
that all men are more competent than all women—”may not be used, as [it] 
once [was], to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority 
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of women.151 Whether Congress amends the law or the Court strikes down 
the gender discriminatory draft, a change is required and overdue. 
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